Conflict of Interest & Credit Rating agencies

For people who use the services of financial advisors (also referred to as Private Banking Relationship Managers or Financial Consultants or Wealth Managers), it would seem odd that not one of them have actually advised the client to "hold on" to cash especially when there are not enough opportunities to invest in the markets or sure-shot stock picks. Often, the relationship managers find enough reasons to stash off this idle money in a single-premium insurance policy or a debt mutual fund or is an 'under-valued' sectoral mutual fund.

The only explanation I could come up for this is, conflict of interest. A relationship manager earns his fees (revenue for the bank) by getting clients invested in various financial products. He might view cash as a wasted opportunity for personal gain, although it might be in the client's best interest to show restraint in investing (esp. during tumulus times like these). Likewise, an RM will be eager to sell you an insurance policy as opposed to a mutual fund - as the former gives him a 30% commission as opposed to a meagre 2% commission for mutual fund investments.

Which makes me wonder - aren't research houses also in the same business? Isn't it in the interest of brokerage houses to inflate stock recommendations - so that investors put their money in the stock through their brokerage channel? At about 0.1% (average of delivery / intra-trade) for every rupee invested, a stock recommendation holds a lot of value. Motilal Oswal (here) has over 400,000 retail clients today and does broking revenue (FY2008) of 562 crores. Taking a ballpark of 0.1% revenue per rupee trade, they do about Rs. 562,000 crores of trades in a year (or Rs. 2,300 crores per day).

I would additionally suggest a reading of the latest Roger Lowenstein article on Moody's published in the NY Times (here).

The scribe starts off with an apt remark by Thomas Friedman in 1996 : "There were two superpowers in the world — the United States and Moody’s bond-rating service — and it was sometimes unclear which was more powerful.". (We now know who turned out the superior one !)

The article takes a hard look at how Moody's evaluated mortgages bundled as securities and assigned a rating to it. It also talks extensively of the mistakes they made in valuation of these securities and how the market crumbled due to lack of foresight, greed and trasparency (well, the lack of it). There is also a paragraph on conflict of interest - where rating industry's closeness with banks (whose securities they rate), often distorts their assessment of the instrument.